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Brain-Challenged Self  
and Self-Challenged Brain
The Central Impasse in Consciousness Studies
Sangeetha Menon 
In its widest sense a man’s Self is the sum total of all that 
he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, 
but his clothes and his wife and children, his ancestors and 
friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and 
yacht and bank-account. If they wax and prosper, he feels 
triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, 
— not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in 
much the same way for all.
William James (Principles of Psychology, 1890)
That which is beyond caste and creed, family and lineage, 
devoid of name and form, merit and demerits, transcending 
space, time and sense objects, that brahman art thou, medi-
tate on this in thy mind.
    Sankaracarya (ad 788−820) 
Vivekacudamoni: 164
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O son of Kunti! Sense-contacts with their objects cause cold 
and heat, pleasure and pain. These come and go—they are 
fleeting, O Bharata prince! Endure them.
O hero! The one whom these do not agitate, who is the same 
in pain and pleasure, and who is wise, becomes fit indeed for 
immortality. 
These bodies that perish are said to pertain to the eternal 
Self that is embodied—the eternal Self, that is imperishable 
and indeterminable.
Bhagavad Gita: 2: 14, 15, 18
The brain is arguably the most important part of the human 
body studied to understand the working of sensation, emotion, and con-
sciousness. The single unit of information and experience that connects 
sensation, emotion, and consciousness is agreed to be the “self.” There 
are two major streams of discussion on the self. Self is debated as a cog-
nitive concept that helps tie the missing ends between the physical and 
psychological functions; and the self is argued to be the locus of con-
scious experience. However different the arguments for these two posi-
tions, it is agreed that human behaviours, attitudes, and emotions are 
intricately tied to the neural structures on one side, and the indivisible 
experiential self on the other. Brain and self are the common threads that 
are used by neuropsychiatry, neuropharmacology, and philosophy to get 
a hold on one of the most intractable problems of humankind, namely, 
“consciousness.”
Is there a common issue in brain and self studies that appears over 
and again? Yes — it is the attempt to explain the unity, continuity, and 
adherence of our experience, whether it is sensory or mental. To address 
the unity, adherence, and continuity of experience is to address the place 
of the self in the brain. A major challenge to this effort is the fact that, 
though we tend to commonly address a static unit by calling it “self,” the 
self is a constantly emerging phenomenon as a result of its interaction 
with nature outside (social and biological) and nurture inside (mind). In 
the process of its emergence, the boundaries of the self seem to change, 
creating havoc for some (in the case of psychiatric challenges) and peace 
to others (in the case of spiritual experiences).
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Philosophically, we continue to ask about mind-body unity—how 
the mind and body, qualitatively different, can connect and give rise to 
meaning and quality to life. The binding problem and the Chalmersian 
hard problem showcase the age-old mind-body problem in the context 
of consciousness. Both demand mechanisms and reasons for mutual 
influence. The interconnections between brain and the self have been 
especially eschewed in the developments in understanding the brain and 
its functions. 
The classical idea of the brain with designated cortical areas and 
assigned functions, though, is still not in vogue; the view that supersedes 
is that the brain is an organ with a high capacity to survive even with 
less cortical areas. There are medical cases where patients seem to live 
“almost normally” in spite of frontal lobotomy or cortical lesions due 
to psychiatric conditions (Feinberg 2001). It is suggested that perhaps 
the limbic system, the seat of emotion, is the most important part of the 
brain without which normal functioning is impossible (DaMasio 1994). 
Another proposal is that all that constitutes the self can be reduced to 
the synaptic connections—the neural pathways. LeDoux (2002) writes:
People don’t come preassembled, but are glued together by life. And 
each time one of us is constructed, a different result occurs. One rea-
son for this is that we all start out with different sets of genes; another 
is that we have different experiences. What’s interesting about this 
formulation is not that nature and nurture both contribute to who 
we are, but that they actually speak the same language. They both 
ultimately achieve their mental and behavioural effects by shaping the 
synaptic organization of the brain. The particular patterns of synaptic 
connections in an individual’s brain, and the information encoded by 
these connections, are the keys to who that person is. 
(LeDoux 2002, p. 3)
The brain also has the capacity to switch areas of neural function if the 
designated cortical area becomes impaired; this capacity is termed “neu-
roplasticity.” The brain has an immense capacity for growth and renewal 
and is modifiable by experience. The synapses involved change because 
of new experiences. 
The plasticity of the brain is accompanied by yet another enigma—
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that the self is somehow able to make sense of the neural changes and 
create corresponding changes in sensations and personal identity. Self-
effort, willpower, positive thinking, love, compassion, spiritual quietude 
and such qualities are found to enhance brain functioning in the case of 
patients who face mental and physical challenges. Just as there are neural 
correlates of consciousness, I wish to suggest that there are self-corre-
lates of consciousness. The self-correlates seem to alter the functions of 
the neural correlates and neural pathways in curious ways.
This brings us to the million-dollar question: Where and how in the 
brain is the “self” housed? How does the self make adaptive changes in 
one’s personality corresponding to changes in the brain? How does the 
self influence and alter neurochemical functions of the brain? Can the 
brain address its structural and functional challenges without recourse 
to the self? Can there be a self without the interface of the brain and the 
limbic system? Are the brain and self constantly challenging each other?
These and similar questions may not give immediate answers consider-
ing the complex ways in which both our brain and self are cross-wired. 
These questions are also difficult to answer because we are not comfort-
able in using concepts that do not have the backing of scientific, causal 
relations. We do not even agree upon different ways of understanding the 
subject and the object other than causal relations. But, several medical 
cases studied by neuropsychiatrists show that the way the patient behaves 
before and after a cure is not even amenable to arrive at straightforward 
causal relations between the brain and the self. The subject-object dis-
tinction itself is shadowed when the brain behaves in ways not true to 
its essential physical neural structure. Can the brain be called distinctly 
objective and physical when it defies the laws of medicine? How does 
the brain and self conceive their roleplay and create the conspiracy of 
experience where the physicality of the brain is lost in the subjectivity of 
the self? 
In this essay—with examples from current research in brain studies, 
neuropsychology, and neuropsychiatry—I will try to show that the sig-
nificant problem in consciousness studies is perhaps not the “hard prob-
lem,” but how to trace the ways in which the brain challenges the self, 
and the self challenges the brain. It is important to continue the classic 
mind-body debates. But equally significant is to understand the emer-
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gence and placement of self in the context of an evolving brain which has 
the capacity to be plastic. Greater insights into the nature of self—neural 
and ontological—will arrive if we focus our research on the challenges 
that the brain and the self give each other.
Discrete but Unconscious Perceptions
Of the many attempts to define the locus of consciousness in the 
brain, a successful one has been the attempt to trace the neural correlates 
of consciousness. The ncc approaches serve two functions: 1. to estab-
lish identity relations between the neural correlate and the conscious 
experience, and 2. to find the causal relations between the two. Inter-
estingly the founders of ncc theory (Crick & Koch 1990) themselves 
were sceptical about the complete success of the attempt. They wrote:
Everyone has a rough idea of what is meant by consciousness. We feel 
that it is better to avoid a precise definition of consciousness because 
of the dangers of premature definition. Until we understand the prob-
lem much better, any attempt at a formal definition is likely to be 
either misleading or overly restrictive, or both.
(Crick & Koch 1990, 264)
A stronger position to ncc is the replacement of a causal relation between 
a neural correlate and the conscious experience by an identity relation—
that there is nothing other than the neural process. The neural process is 
the conscious experience.
Such a position would ask: Do we need consciousness to see an object? 
Do we need the self to respond to what we perceive? One of the strong 
proponents of such questions is Nicholas HuMphrey (2006). He 
believes that the self is not made entirely of conscious or explicit events. 
Many perceptual processes are implicit and we are not conscious of them. 
With his training in primatology, psychology, and cognitive science, 
Humphrey nonchalantly dismisses the subjective nature of consciousness 
and the ontological reality of self. 
In his book Seeing Red, Humphrey investigates the traditional mind-
body problem in the context of consciousness. How are conscious expe-
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riences related to the physical brain? Adhering to an identity theory, 
Humphrey suggests that instead of finding a causal explanation for con-
sciousness we need to find the neural correlate for each conscious mental 
experience. I will show that the ncc is identical with the content of the 
brain. 
Consciousness is nothing other than sensations. We cannot talk about 
consciousness without sensations. He argues that all perceptions are 
unconscious and all sensations are actions. According to Humphrey, in 
the case of seeing a red object, there are two red things—the red object 
projected and the red sensation (visual experience). The perceiver sees 
the object, but he does not see the visual experience of the object. He 
consciously sees real things in the real world and not his experiences of 
those things. Perception of the red object and sensation of it are inde-
pendent. We have the illusion that sensation and perception are linked 
because they occur at the same time. Sensation and perception, although 
they are triggered by the same event, are essentially independent, occur-
ring not in series but in parallel, and only interacting, if they ever do, 
much further down the line (HuMphrey 2006, 50). Visual experience 
is a form of action. For Humphrey, having a red sensation, waving your 
hand, and shouting at someone — all three are actions. 
Consciousness is made of a certain kind of physical activity inside the 
subject’s head. And this activity, we can assume, has been designed by 
natural selection, using nothing other than the resources of a biologi-
cally evolved nervous system.  (HuMphrey 2006, 75)
Humphrey supports his claim that perceptions are unconscious, with 
several arguments. In the case of blindness some kind of visual percep-
tion takes place. But there is no conscious visual experience. Perception 
of the object exists without the “sensation” of seeing. Another example 
he mentions is that of subliminal perception whereby an advertiser gets 
a message across so rapidly that we are unconscious of seeing it on the 
television screen. Just as there can be perception without sensations, 
there can be changes in sensation without corresponding changes in per-
ception. When a person is under the influence of LSD and other halluci-
nogens he may have the sensation that a chair has become gigantic while 
still perceiving the regular chair. The general argument that Humphrey 
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makes is that there are various instances in which the conscious visual 
experience and the unconscious perception come apart.
One of the best criticisms for Humphrey’s position, and the mainte-
nance of the qualitative nature of experience, is given by John Searle 
(2006). Searle considers mind and brain to belong to different dimen-
sions. Humphrey’s attempt is to put the conscious experience and the 
physical brain in the same dimension. The mind has qualitative subjec-
tivity. The brain does not have it. The experience of seeing red has a 
qualitative subjectivity, but the neuron firings that produce this do not. 
Seeing red is a first-person phenomenon. Neuron firings are third-person 
objective phenomena which look theoretically similar. Seeing red is the 
action of “redding.” This cannot be — actions like shouting or lifting my 
hand is up to me. But when I stare at a screen it is not up to me whether 
I see red.
Because some perceptions can take place without the subject’s con-
scious awareness of them, we cannot conclude that perception is uncon-
scious. Blindsight only suggests that there are several perceptual visual 
pathways in the brain, and not all of them are conscious. We cannot say 
that the only form of consciousness one can have is sensation. It is pos-
sible that we can have no sensations at all. Consciousness is not seeing 
alone or feeling sensations alone. 
According to Vedanta, consciousness is self-luminous. It not only illu-
minates an object but is also self-luminous. Both sensation and intro-
spection are available for conscious agents. Humphrey does not consider 
the self-luminous nature of consciousness, but only considers the cogni-
tive function that leads to (visual) sensation. 
Subject and object
The standard neuroscience position is that once neurobiologists identify 
the neural correlate of consciousness—the electrochemical events that 
occur in the brain when we have subjective experiences—then they can 
be tested to find if the correlation is causal. Perhaps the relation is not 
even causal but identical. There is no subjectivity bereft of a bodily feed-
back mechanism. Conscious sensations have evolved by monitoring our 
responses to input stimuli, and modifying the sensory pathways accord-
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ingly. They function to give us a sense of “Self.” HuMphrey, Dennett 
(1997) and others who concur with this line of thinking are essentially 
interested in removing the primacy of self in conscious experience and 
thereby make consciousness similar to any other biological function. 
Whether causal or identity relations, the subject of consciousness is per-
vious to and exhausted by neurobiology, according to both Searle and 
Humphrey. 
According to Searle (2006) “understanding consciousness is just a 
matter of neurobiological research,” and finding the unified field (Searle 
2005). However, there are many philosophical and conceptual difficulties 
along the way. Searle considers the “brain an extremely difficult object 
to study.” Why does Searle consider the brain a difficult “object”? It is 
largely because there seems to be an impassable difficulty in understand-
ing how the object gives rise to the subject. How does the functioning 
of the physical object, the brain, give rise to a personal subjective con-
sciousness? How or why does the subject come from the object?
Is this question a foolproof one? Why do we assume that the subject 
comes from the object? Is it possible that the subject itself has fashioned 
the object to be what it is? If this question is relevant, then purpose, 
intention, and meaning of what we sensate become important. Perhaps 
there are no straight-jacketed causal and unidirectional connections 
between the subject and object. It is not just “seeing red” but seeing red 
in a context filled by memories, likes and dislikes, emotions, hopes, and 
feelings. The context gets significance over the otherwise boring singular 
sensation. When LeDoux (2002) asserts that all that is is a “synaptic 
self,” he also concedes that it is an organic self that is biological, psycho-
logical, and cultural. What is not clear in LeDoux’s take is the route from 
the “synaptic self” to the “organic self.” Perhaps for LeDoux and other 
like-minded neurobiologists the route is not even important.
On a reductionist perspective about sensation we could say that the 
self is not just a static placeholder to affirm or dismiss the subjectivity of 
experience. Considering our lived experiences, self is a dynamic entity 
that can change, causes change on other selves, and is changed by other 
selves. Self does not appear to us as the sum of all sensations, because it 
is definitely something more, which is revealed only through the person-
ality and attitudes of the person. And, that “something more” is what 
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makes all the difference to our personal lives and adds richness. Such a 
self is unavailable in the animal world and hence cannot be understood 
however many experiments are done with animals, as against LeDoux’s 
claim. Self is not the collection of processes that lead to sensations. It is 
responsible for the mental content around and in those sensations. Con-
tent cannot be replaced by the process.
The “Feel” Factor and Its Representation
Unified feel
Most of human experiences come as a unified whole. There is a funda-
mental unity to all experiences. We can have not just one single unified 
sensory experience but multi-sensorial experiences. Each discrete sen-
sory experience is presented to us as a unified whole. The multi-sensorial 
experience also is presented as a unified whole. Our experience presents 
all in one go. We can have five sensory experiences that are directed to 
one object or several objects at the same time. I could be eating an apple, 
watching the blue waves, feeling the wind on my skin, smelling the fresh 
air, hearing the distant call of the boatman—all these are experienced at 
the same time with a clear distinctive feel for each. At the same time I 
could be also revelling in what could be described as a nostalgic feeling 
about the rivers in Kerala. All these feelings are experienced in a discrete 
as well as a wholesome manner. They all are cohered in a unitary subject 
which is myself. 
Chalmers (in Bayne and ChalMers 2003) says that at any given time, 
a subject has a multiplicity of experiences. These experiences are distinct 
from each other. But at the same time they are unified by being aspects 
of a single encompassing state of consciousness. This total state is not 
a conjunction of different conscious states. But it is another conscious 
state in its own right.
Representationalism
A strong supposition among the philosophers of mind is that all men-
tal facts and states can be explained in terms of natural science—that 
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mind can be naturalized and explained reductively in terms of neural 
functions. Another contention that argues against this supposition is that 
the subjective nature of experience cannot be naturalised since the pro-
cesses responsible are rooted in representational structures of mind. The 
notion of “mental representation” is a major contender, to understand 
qualia, amongst philosophers of mind in terms of cognition. Primarily, 
mental representation is a concept that has arisen from the theories of 
cognitive science. 
Computational psychology and cognitive neuroscience postulate dif-
ferent structures and processes towards understanding representation. 
Often these structures are not parts of common experience, but are lin-
guistic tools for representing the phenomenal, the feel factor. Computa-
tional theory of mind suggests that brain is like a computer and mental 
processes are computations. Metzinger (2003) cautions against such 
approaches:
Because many such philosophers are superb at analyzing the deeper 
structure of language, they often fall into the trap of analyzing the 
conscious mind as if it were itself a linguistic entity, based not on 
dynamical self-organization in the human brain, but on a disembodied 
system of rule-based information processing. (Metzinger 2003, 4)
From ancient times the mind has been viewed as consisting of cognition, 
affect (emotion), and conation (motivation). A valid criticism against the 
approaches in cognitive science is that though the claim is that “mind” 
is studied, only one aspect of mind is projected to represent the whole of 
mind, namely cognition. Emotion and motivation are as important, or at 
times more important, than the cognitive rules we apply in life. Ledoux 
(2002) makes the following perceptive argument:
The fact that emotion and motivation are not studied by cognitive sci-
ence makes sense if cognitive science is regarded as a science of cogni-
tion, but is troubling if the field is supposed to be the science of mind. 
A mind without feelings and strivings (the kind of mind traditionally 
studied in cognitive science) might be able to solve certain problems 
given by a cognitive psychologist, but it doesn’t stack up well as the 
mental foundation of a self. The kind of mind modeled by cognitive 
science can, for example, play chess very well, and can even be pro-
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grammed to cheat. But it is not plagued with guilt when it cheats, 
or distracted by love, anger, or fear. Neither is it self-motivated by a 
competitive streak, or by envy or compassion. If we are to understand 
how the mind, through the brain, makes us who we are, we need to 
consider the whole mind, not just the parts that subserve thinking.
(LeDoux 2002, 14)
An offshoot of these attempts is to learn the behaviour of single neu-
rons and identify them with exclusive cognitive functions. A report 
quoting the findings announced at the recent annual meeting of the 
Society for Neuroscience says that scientists who examine single neu-
rons in the human brain have successfully identified individual brain 
cells responding to particular stimuli such as pictures of individual peo-
ple and objects.1 They have also found that people can control the firing 
of the single neurons. These research findings may help scientists under-
stand the cognitive processes and how individual brain cells respond to 
particular stimuli. The hope from such studies is that the findings may 
find application in building machines that can be controlled by human 
thoughts. Such machines could help people who cannot move, like those 
suffering from quadriplegia. 
But, is there a potential danger lingering in such exclusivist stud-
ies? The whole field throws open a highly controversial subject as far 
as human ethics is concerned. The possibility of knowing how a single 
neuron stores information also suggests ways for manipulating it for 
pedagogic and medical reasons. And this questions the role and place of 
human self, agency and freewill.
Bodily subjectivity and qualities
To review the place of the self in the dominant philosophical theories 
of brain-mind relations, it is important to understand how representa-
tionalism conceptualises subjectivity. Philosophers like Michael Tye 
(2003), who holds a strong representationalist view, defines the phe-
nomenal (experiential) character of an experience as one and the same as 
1. See PHYSORG.com; http://www.physorg.com/news175417796.html; accessed 
on 25 October 2009.
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its poised, abstract, nonconceptual, intentional content (Tye 2003, 176). 
The phenomenal aspects of an experience is not present in the neural 
events or in a unified experience. They present themselves at the closure 
of the experience. Phenomenal unity comes along with the closure of 
experience under conjunction (Tye 2003, 84). Just as the meaning of a 
word is not a quality of the word, the phenomenal character of an experi-
ence is not a quality the experience possesses.2 
According to Tye the content of qualia is nonconceptual and is not 
neurophysiological. We have different feelings for different shades of red. 
Even if we don’t have different concepts for those shades of red, we are 
capable of many more feelings than concepts. Feelings lie in the interface 
of conceptual and nonconceptual domains. It is the output of the early, 
largely modular sensory processing and is the input to another system of 
higher-level cognitive processing. Differing from Fodor, Tye holds that 
a sentence would not be enough to represent a sensation, as a sensation 
includes some kind of “mapping” of the domain it refers to. For exam-
ple, pain is about the body, and needs a way to represent the body parts 
that are affected by pain. Sentences lack this map-like representational 
power (Tye 1995). Tye proposes an ‘encompassing experience’ (he ques-
tions it and dismisses it subsequently since it leads to infinite regress) 
that includes all other experiences within itself. Experience is the bearer 
of the unified phenomenology (Tye 2003, 20). 
The question of unity of experience is crucial in understanding the 
feel factor in an experience. Does each sensory experience come with a 
feel unique to it? Or is it that there is only a single experience with a rich 
feel? How is the distinct feel of discrete sensory experiences retained in a 
single unified experience? 
Tye dismisses the very possibility of a metalevel of unification of sen-
sory experiences. His key argument is that the unification happens at the 
end of the experience and is part of the process of representation.
[T]o the question of what unifies different simultaneous bodily expe-
riences is that it is a pseudoquestion, based on a mistaken assumption. 
2. Tye, “Qualia,” From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (First published 20 
August 1997; substantive revision 31 July 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
qualia/, accessed on 27 October 2009.
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There is only a single bodily experience at a time, an experience with a 
very rich and complex bodily phenomenal content. Qualities that are 
experienced in undergoing bodily experience—qualities that are not 
qualities of experiences but rather qualities of bodily disturbances, if 
they are qualities of anything—are experienced together at a time by 
entering into this shared content. In this way, the painfulness of a pain, 
the itchiness of an itch, the ticklishness of a tickle are phenomenologi-
cally unified.  (Tye 2003, 66)
The Case for Non-Physical Feelings
Can I “feel” without a sensory experience? How do I under-
stand the feelings that I have mentally that are not necessarily dependent 
on sensations? Much of the discussion on qualia is pre-dependent on 
the body and the examples are centered on bodily-subjectivity. But we 
know that we can “feel” without physical objects that are invoked by 
our thoughts, fears, elations, and such mental phenomena. During some 
occasions the “feel” extends from the mind to the spirit through the val-
ues that we cherish such as altruism and compassion.
Tye’s view on qualia as a representation brings in the body as the cen-
ter of subjectivity and thus discourages the scope for a nonphysical self. 
He argues that feelings are not properties of experience, and that bodily 
subjectivity plays the role of a continuing self. 
Tye also seems to favour an intentional account of consciousness. But, 
in actual experience, we could argue that there is a greater role played 
by non-intentional consciousness, a consciousness that is not directed 
towards any object. The feel-experience that is directed from an object 
presupposes a non-intentional, pure, I-consciousness (“introspective 
consciousness,” as termed by Tye) until that experience happens. Also, 
the I-consciousness stays in a different form in the background, so to 
say, as a reflective awareness (not the “responsive consciousness” sug-
gested by Tye). It is the reflective awareness that enables the phenom-
enal character of the experience to be related to the subject. We are able 
to reflect upon the feel factor because of a non-intentional consciousness 
that presents itself continuously.
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Every experience, along with the distinct sensory feel, comes with 
another awareness which is of a “belongingness” or “owning,” as Kant 
says. But the ownership itself is an expression of the non-intentional 
consciousness. Vedanta describes this as one of the characteristics of the 
ontological self which serves as the adhering entity enabling us to aware 
the sensory experience(s). Strong representationalism defended by peo-
ple such as Dretske, Tye, and Lycan holds that feeling is a representation 
of a certain kind which can be specified in functionalist or other physical-
ist terms. There is no need for recourse to properties of any ontologically 
“new” sort (Tye 1995). The mistake by Tye and others lies in confound-
ing the phenomenal and ontological aspects of self and using them in an 
interchanged manner. For them, it is not a viable position to accept the 
ontological aspect of the self. 
The other issue that has to be debated is the impersonal characteris-
tic of qualia that is endorsed by the representationalists. Our sensations 
do not come to us in a blank receptor mode. The unique features of 
our personalities are the filters through which they arrive, change, and 
sustain. Hence the implications of the feel factor will be different for 
each person. The feel factor is not an isolated, clear, cognitive event. It 
is much more subjective in the sense it involves mood changes, invokes 
memories, and even brings in value. The phenomenal aspects of an expe-
rience can transform a person. Hence the result or extent of the feel can 
continue for many days, indefinitely, or stay only for the moment. 
The mystery of “what it is like” is because we tend to address it in 
a cognitive context. With such an address its wholesome character is 
reduced or ignored. The query “what it is like to be someone” is, in its 
uniqueness, about subjectivity and being as a whole. This query is dis-
tinct from two other queries:
(a) What it is like to have raw green chilly?
(b) What it is like to have the flavor of raw green chilly enjoyed by X?
(a) is about the experience of a distinct sensation and (b) is about the 
distinct X-centric feelings that s/he enjoys from the flavour. (a) is object-
centred. (b) is person centered. Is (a) equivalent to (b)? 
Unless we make this distinction we will not even be able to approach 
the larger question of “what it is like to be oneself.” Nagel remarks: “… 
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the analogical form of the English expression “what it is like?” is mis-
leading. It does not mean “what (in our experience) it resembles,” but 
rather “how it is for the subject himself?”3
Feelings challenge the brain
The discussion on qualia brings in the discussion on the relation between 
sensation and its designated feel. Each discrete sensation comes with its 
designated feel. The feel of touch is different from the feel of watching 
a sunset. The feel of anger is different from both these. This means that 
each sensation and mental state is discretely experienced. However, we 
cannot say that the feel is a property of the object of experience. We can 
only presume that the feel is a property of subjective experiences which is 
invoked by the object. 
Yet another issue is about the universality of feeling. When we have a 
headache, or drink coffee, or watch the redness of an evening sky, they 
invoke a certain element of discomfort (in the case of a headache) or joy 
(in the case of watching a sunset) or another feel. This means that the 
feel factor is in a way dependent on the object and the personality of its 
beholder. The nature of the feeling invoked by the objects has universal-
ity such as ownership and an assuring sense of being related to the expe-
rienced world. But the consequences of feeling need not be the same for 
all. For instance, I may become irritated with my headache and have a 
bad mood the whole day. Or I may quietly put up with the discomfort 
without being overwhelmed by it. The feel factor is guided by the reflec-
tive consciousness the self possesses. In any case, what is arguably con-
firmed is that there is a subjective feeling to human experience, and this 
has unique as well as universal features. They influence the experience, 
those who experience, it, and the cohabitants.
What offers serious challenges to the unidirectional and closed theories 
about feeling and its relation to sensation is the question “can sensa-
tions be altered”? Can perceptions happen without a feeling? Is there a 
possibility for the brain to transfer and switch over sensory functions? Is 
3. See Thomas Nagel. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review, 
October 1974, reprinted in Hofstadter and Dennett 1981, 395.
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feeling a natural state or is it induced? What is the nature of the subjec-
tive self that gives a coherent feeling of sensations? If we establish the 
irreducible feel factor in experience then can we argue for an irreducible 
self? I discuss these questions with the help of the thought experiment of 
the autocerebroscope, synesthesia, and “soundscape” (auditory vision).
Arguments for the non-reducibility of feeling are often demonstrated 
with thought experiments. “Mary’s knowledge” argument (Jackson 
1977), and the “what it is like to be a bat” argument (Nagel 1974) make 
strong cases for the existence of qualia. Yet another thought experiment 
to favour the subjective irreducibility of qualia is the fictional instrument 
called the “autocerebroscope” suggested by Feigl (1967). It helps make 
a strong argument for the independent existence of feeling, though in a 
macabre manner. Autocerebroscope is a hypothetical brain scanner with 
which you can look into your brain and see the neural firings for your 
experiences. The experiment implies the limitations of causal relations 
in explaining the connections between neural processes and the actual 
experience. Feinberg explains the thought experiment:
There is a viewer attached to the probe with a magnification device 
that allows you to observe the neurons of your own brain. Suppose 
one day, as you are merrily viewing your brain, you come upon your 
thalamus, the source of your feeling of pain. Suddenly you sneeze, and 
the scope’s eyepiece pokes you in the eye! You now experience intense 
pain while you are looking through the scope at the very neurons in 
the thalamus that created that pain. Now you ask yourself: Did you 
see anything through your autocerebroscope that was equal to the 
pain that you experienced? Was there anything that you observed that 
explained your pain? You surely saw the neurons responsible for your 
pain, and you could analyze the brain chemistry of these neurons, but 
does this allow you to reduce your pain to those neurons? It was your 
neurons themselves, not your image of the neurons through the viewer, 
that hurts! It occurs to you that there appears to be a gap between 
the neurons as they are observed by you and the neurons themselves 
as they are experienced by you within your brain. And you cannot 
find the source of this difference no matter how long and hard you 
observe your brain and think about the thalamus. (Feinberg 2001) 
The unbridgeable gap between observing a brain in a feeling state and 
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being a brain in the feeling state seems to only increase. How and why 
does brain activity generate feeling? It is not how the specific patterns 
of brain activity are generated. It is a question about how feeling itself 
is generated (Harnard 2005). The feel factor is inevitable when the 
neural description of a particular feeling is incomplete without the actual 
experience. Further, it is not even possible to chart a clear pathway that 
begins with the physicality of neural structures and ends with the sub-
jectivity of the experience. Perhaps that is the reason why Chalmers pre-
ferred to call it the “hard problem” of consciousness.
The Self’s Interest is to Make Sense
Are the “how” and “when” (correlates) of feelings neurally 
determined? Is the brain hard wired for each sensation separately and 
without change? Does the brain always differentiate senses? Can there be 
cross-sensory experiences? Can the conscious agent intervene and adapt 
to such experiences? Does feeling always follow sensation and not vice 
versa? The case studies in synasthesia (RaMachandran 1998; Cyto-
wic 2002) and experiments in auditory vision challenge our classic idea 
about sensation.
Synesthesia4 involves a breakdown in communication between areas 
within the brain, leading to a release of limbic processes which are, in 
turn, experienced as synesthetic percepts (Cytowic 2002). It is a percep-
tual condition of mixed sensations. A stimulus in one sensory modality 
involuntarily elicits a sensation in a different sense or senses. An inter-
nal intentional object is constructed during perception (Cytowic 2002, 
350) without a corresponding external object of reference. Synesthetes 
also experience mixed sensations with the same modality. For instance, 
perception of a form may induce a perception of colour. 
The mixing up of sight with sound (chromosthesia) is by far the most 
frequent synesthetic experience. Color, movement, and geometric shape 
4. The word anesthesia means “no sensation.” Synesthesia means “joined sensa-
tion” (Greek, syn = together; aisthesis = perception). Synesthesia may also be induced 
by sensory deprivation, hallucinogens such as LSD and peyote, or direct electrical 
stimulation of subcortical limbic structures.
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are typical properties of the synesthete’s sensations. For persons endowed 
with colored hearing, for example, speech and music are not only heard, 
but also a visual mélange of colored shapes, movement, and scintillation 
is experienced (Cytowic 2002, 16). The narration of the strange experi-
ences that a synesthete could have baffles us and questions our taken-for-
granted notions about normality, beliefs, discrete sensory experiences, 
and body responses that we think we naturally have. Cytowic writes:
Aside from VE in my original 42-case sample, I have found only one 
other in whom sight evokes smell; for this man, CLF, ‘‘Most things 
I see or hear have a strong taste as well.’’ Other than my index case 
MW, in which taste and smell evoked widespread tactile experience, 
I have encountered one individual for whom smell triggers touch 
and another in whom taste induces a secondary experience of color. 
Apart from MW’s geometric taste, perhaps the strangest synesthesia is 
‘‘audiomotor,’’ in which an adolescent positioned his body in differ-
ent postures according to the sounds of different words. Both English 
and nonsense words compelled certain physical movements, the boy 
claimed, which he could demonstrate by striking various poses. By 
way of convincing himself of this sound-to-movement association, the 
physician who described it planned to retest the boy later on with-
out warning. When the doctor read the same word list aloud 10 years 
later, the boy assumed, without hesitation, the identical postures of a 
decade earlier.   (Cytowic 2002, 16)
Studies also show that emotion and the limbic system have a greater 
role in synesthesia. Emotion, in fact, has a significant role in normal sen-
sory function.5 Ramachandran’s example of the sounds “buba” and “kiki” 
(RaMachandran 1998) that give an image of smoothness and rugged-
ness to the listener, perhaps also encourages us to consider if we add 
emotional valence to sounds in our everyday life. In his historic work, 
Cytowic (2002) details the extensive studies he undertook to find the 
basis of synesthesia. What is pertinent in synesthesia, according to Cyto-
wic, is the prominence of intense emotion and strong beliefs. Synesthetic 
percepts, according to him, are neither a conventional perception nor 
5. We will discuss this in more detail below.
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an image. They possess a curious spatial extension and dynamism, and 
are involuntary, automatic, and consistent over time (Cytowic 2002, 
33). Synesthesia is abnormal only in being statistically rare. He argues 
that synesthesia is possibly a normal brain process that is prematurely 
displayed to consciousness in a minority of individuals. Is the brain adap-
tive to our efforts to replenish it with sensory content in the wake of the 
failure of one sensory modality? The case of synesthesia suggests the pos-
sibility. Synesthesia is usually a genetic condition. But a synesthetic-like 
experience is not an impossibility with the intervention of modern day 
research. 
For example, work by Peter Meijer on the vOICE apparatus helps the 
blind through auditory vision, seeing with sound.6 vOICE allows the 
blind to represent visual information, to “see,” with sounds. The device 
is a tiny camera, a laptop, and headphones. The camera is mounted on 
the head and the laptop takes the video input and converts it into audi-
tory information, or “soundscapes.” The scene in front is scanned in ste-
reo. The object on the left is heard through the subject’s left ear and the 
object on his right is heard through his right ear. Brightness is translated 
as volume. Bright things are louder. Pitch tells you what is up and what is 
down. The image refreshes once a second.7 
Efforts continue to locate the responsible neural region and explore 
the potential of auditory vision. A recent announcement from Neuro-
report says that identifying objects with a visual-to-auditory sensory 
substitution device is associated with activation of occipital visual areas.8 
When you identify an object’s shape, a particular part of your brain called 
the lateral-occipital tactile-visual area (LOtv) is activated. At first this 
area was thought to be purely visual. Amir Amedi et al. have shown that 
6. In Lakshmi Sandhana, “Blind ‘See’ with Sound,” BBC News, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3171226.stm (accessed 24 October 2009).
7. At http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/magazine/11ideas_section3-14.htm
l?ex=1291957200&en=3c72cf9fa46bbb06&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss 
(accessed 26 October 2009); and see also www.seeingwithsound.com.
8. L. Merabet, L. Battelli, S. Obretenova, S. Maguire, P. Meijer and A. Pascual-
Leone,  “Functional Recruitment of Visual Cortex for sound encoded object identifi-
cation in the Blind,” NeuroReport. 20/ 2, pp. 132–38, January 2009 (http://dx.doi.
org/ 10.1097/WNR.0b013e32832104dc).
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touch and hearing could also activate it.9 You can touch and “see” a 
shape. You can hear and “see” a shape. Amedi suggests a significant find-
ing that the brain is ultimately not interested in the mode of input as 
much as we assume generally. The brain is driven by the presence of an 
object. Whether the input is visual, tactile, or auditory is not reckoned. 
The instances narrated above imply that feel is not strictly pre-desig-
nated with a sense organ. What we can assume is that there is a feel fac-
tor (due to the presence or absence of a sensation) that influences the 
brain to behave differently either by natural disposition (as in the case 
of synesthesia) or by non-invasive techniques such as auditory vision. 
These instances question our standard ways of understanding the work-
ing of the brain. They also bring to light the place of the human self that 
constantly challenges the brain, and seeks adaptability to neural changes, 
through willpower, the urge to experience, the hope to live better, and 
emotional richness. 
EMotions, Feelings, and the Self
Mainstream neuroscience and neuropsychiatry tend to favour 
a cybernetic view of human personality where sensation, awareness, and 
experience are tools for humans to interact with the environment, and 
improve based on the feedback received from sensations. The standard 
view about the human brain emerges from the position that brain areas 
and functions can be chartered, and that the brain behaves in a hierarchi-
cal order with the cortex in the lead. Sense organs perceive and produce 
sensations. The mind builds concepts, and the brain puts them together 
through formal computational configurations, linguistic rules, and label-
ing. Much of the work in cognitive science takes this as the standard view. 
Is not this itself a poor concept—to divide the brain and human capac-
ities into sensations and concepts? Are we just machine-like, performing 
9. A. Amedi, W. Stern, J. A. Camprodon, F. Bermpohl, L. Merabet, S. Rotman, 
C. Hemond, P. Meijer and A. Pascual-Leone, “Shape conveyed by visual-to-auditory 
sensory substitution activates the lateral occipital complex,” Nature Neuroscience 
10/6: 687–89, June 2007 (http://dx.doi.org /10.1038/nn1912).
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only rule-based cognitive tasks? Is not being a human much to do with 
the emotions and feelings we give and take, the worries and joys we expe-
rience, the hopes and expectations we cherish, the values and visions we 
build, the constant exploration we engage in to know our true selves? 
Richard Cytowic writes:
[I]t is linear and therefore something like a machine. The metaphoric 
likening of the brain, reason, and the mind to a machine is well known 
and extensively written about. The concept of hierarchy makes the 
cortex the brain’s most important part. This part of the standard view 
says that the cortex is where consciousness, mind, reason, and real-
ity are all located, and that everything below it is literally subservi-
ent. An important corollary says that language is the supreme cortical 
function; therefore, introspection, which is our self-conscious internal 
talking to ourselves, is a valid way to understand everything that goes 
on in our minds. Introspection has a long history in the philosophy of 
mind, but I will show its severe limitations and that we actually have 
several concurrent streams-of-consciousness running every moment.
(Cytowic 2002, 25)
In recent times there has been greater interest to bring such a posi-
tion to scrutiny. This interest has been favoured by the narratives and 
case studies neuropsychiatrists share with the world. Documentation of 
medical cases, though, is a practice that has existed for a very long time, 
the books and works produced in the current and last decade take the 
novel method of storytelling. And, we have a penchant to listen to sto-
ries; especially when they are about the strange and curious experiences 
of our fellow beings. Cashing in on our innate interest in hearing about 
ourselves, the works come in with interesting titles which would qualify 
for literary imagination.10
Many of these titles though hold on to a hardcore neural and evolu-
tionary description of the self, leaving an open space to wonder if the self 
will ever become amenable to neural laws and explanations. The persis-
tence to hold a neural reductionism is best seen in the efforts to simplis-
10. See titles such as “The man who tasted shapes”; “The man who mistook his 
wife for a hat” (Sacks 1985); “Feeling of what happens” (DaMasio 1999).
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tically label certain cortical areas to be the locus of nuanced emotions 
and self-expressions. Temporal lobes get to be the deciding factor of all 
that we can express and have in terms of emotion and imagination; and 
of course dysfunctions are attributed to the same deciding factors.
Self in many of these discussions is merely a placeholder to put discrete 
functions into a coherant whole. Terms such as “synaptic self,” “proto-
self,” “narrative self,” “autobiographical self,” “enduring self,” and so 
forth are used to explain the neural basis of self. Ramachandran writes:
…enduring self, is neither a separable subject of consciousness nor a 
homunculus, but it can be mapped anatomically to limbic and other 
associated structures which ‘drive’ frontal executive processes.… Even 
though the notion of a unitary, enduring self may turn out to be a 
form of adaptive self-deception or delusion … we must consider why 
the illusion arises.  (RaMachandran 1998, 429–57)
According to Metzinger:
It is just a way of experiencing reality: currently, you are someone. 
What makes consciously experienced selfhood special, and different 
from all the other forms of experiential content, is the fact that—in 
nonpathological standard situations and in beings like ourselves—it is 
highly invariant. It is always there.  (Metzinger 2003, p. 626)
Damasio is certain about the veracity of neural explanations but quibbles:
…consciousness is the process whereby a mind is imbued with a refer-
ence we call self, and is said to know of its own existence and of the 
existence of objects around it.  (DaMasio, 1994, 192)
A friend of mine who follows the developments of biology with keen 
interest and is an equally avid seeker of the spiritual in life often asks 
me if the spirit can be defined and located in neurobiological terms. 
“What is the spirit?” “Where is it?” How can I answer? I must con-
fess I do not favor the attempt to neurologize religious experiences, 
especially when the attempts take the form of identifying a brain cen-
ter for God or justifying God and religion by finding their correlates 
in brain scans. Yet, spiritual experiences, religious or otherwise, are 
mental processes. They are biological processes of the highest level 
of complexity. They occur in the brain of a given organism in certain 
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circumstances and there is no reason why we should shy away from 
describing those processes in neurobiological terms provided we are 
aware of the limitations of the exercise.  (DaMasio 2003, 284)
The working definitions of self proposed by Ramachandran, Metzinger, 
Damasio, et al. inspire us to ask further questions. On what premises can 
we conclude that the self is a delusion and not the rest of the concepts we 
build or the experiences we have? What is the benchmark for that distinct 
judgment? Are our “normal” behaviours and life expressions interesting 
only to the extent that they are not pathological? If we pre-concede the 
limitations of a method in advance then how can we claim veracity and 
finality for its hypotheses? Responses to these questions are answered to 
a great extent by the studies on the brain in the context of the emotional 
and social self. Damasio perhaps brings in the essential argument of my 
paper as stated in the title. The self is challenged by the brain and the 
brain is challenged by the self. 
For Damasio, for instance, spiritual experiences are biological and 
mental processes of the highest level of complexity. To describe them 
in neurobiological terms has its limitations. But the efforts have to con-
tinue. The self and brain mutually reinforce at all times. We might say 
that to delimit the connections to wholly neurological, mental, or spiri-
tual domains perhaps is putting the cart behind the horse. Perhaps, the 
truth about each lies in its interactions with the other.
The mainstream studies in cognitive science focus on reason-driven 
qualities of consciousness. When even a subject matter such as feel is 
studied in an exclusively rational fashion, DaMasio (1994, 1999, 2003)
and LeDoux’s (2002) approach to integrate emotion into the study of 
self is noteworthy, though the method is mostly biological. Damasio con-
siders consciousness and emotions as states of the body, more specifically 
the immune system. He uses Cartesian dualism as a point of departure 
and argues based on neuroscientific research that reason and emotion 
are closely linked. He distinguishes feelings from emotions (DaMasio 
1999). Emotion is physical. Feeling is mental. For Damasio, emotions 
are neural processes that respond to a stimulus. Emotion is the reaction 
for a stimulus to choose flight-or-fight options. It is also responsible for 
the homeostatic regulation. 
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Here too a similar question arises as in the case of qualia. If all that 
is meant by qualia is to automatically provide organisms with survival-
oriented behaviours then why is a subjective feel involved in emotion? 
Homeostasis and response to stimulus can happen without generating 
a subjective emotion. But then it looks like emotions’ influence is com-
plex, in the words of Damasio himself who formulates a reductive bio-
logical theory of emotions and consciousness.
In organisms equipped to sense emotions, that is, to have feelings, 
emotions also have an impact on the mind, as they occur, in the 
here and now. But in organisms equipped with consciousness, that 
is, capable of knowing they have feelings, another level of regulation 
is reached. Consciousness allows feelings to be known and thus pro-
motes the impact of emotion internally, allows emotion to permeate 
the thought process through the agency of feeling. Eventually, con-
sciousness allows any object to be known—the “object” emotion and 
any other object—and, in so doing, enhances the organism’s ability to 
respond adaptively, mindful of the needs of the organism in question. 
Emotion is devoted to an organism’s survival, and so is consciousness. 
(DaMasio 1999, 35)
Feeling is a mental representation or mental map of the bodily state. 
Feeling is a mental awareness, whereas emotion is a visible effect. Emo-
tion is physical and precedes feeling which is mental. Emotion results in 
a physical behaviour and creates a neural map which in turn leads to the 
feeling. Damasio echoes William JaMes’ idea (1884) that we first react 
with the body and then we feel. James talks about the transition from an 
“object-simply-apprehended,” through the sense organ, to an “object-
emotionally-felt.”  
A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity.… Emotion dis-
sociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable.… Emotion is nothing 
but the feeling of the reflex bodily effects of what we call its “objects,” 
effects due to the connate adaptation of the nervous system to that 
object.… Emotion both begins and ends with what we call its effects 
or manifestations. It has no mental status except as either the pre-
sented feeling, or the idea, of the manifestations.… An object falls on 
a sense-organ and is apperceived by the appropriate cortical centre; or 
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else the latter, excited in some other way, gives rise to an idea of the 
same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through 
their pre-ordained channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin and 
viscus; and these alterations, apperceived like the original object, in as 
many specific portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness 
and transform it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-
emotionally-felt.   (JaMes 1884, 188–205)
Developing the view of James on the bodily origin of emotion, a key 
hypothesis Damasio offers is the “somatic marker” (DaMasio 1994) 
which highlights the importance of emotional learning in making effec-
tive decisions. There is an important role for feelings in reasoning. In a 
given situation feelings enable us to narrow down the number of pos-
sible choices for an action. They help us with consequential thinking and 
cautions about high risk actions. The idea of somatic markers, according 
to Damasio, also has potential benefits in therapy for mental health.
Knowing about emotion, feeling, and their workings does matter to 
how we live. At the personal level, this is quite certain. Within the next 
two decades, perhaps sooner, the neurobiology of emotion and feel-
ings will allow biomedical science to develop effective treatments for 
pain and depression grounded on a sweeping understanding of how 
genes are expressed in particular brain regions and how these regions 
cooperate to make us emote and feel. Combined with psychological 
interventions, the novel therapies will revolutionize mental health.
(DaMasio 2003, 184)
Through historic medical cases11 and his own case studies DaMasio 
(1999) demonstrates that impairment to the prefrontal cortical area 
(the seat of “somatic markers”) also impairs the ability to use reason or 
11. The historic case study of Gage has led to significant findings. Phineas Gage’s 
accident that destroyed areas of his prefrontal lobe consequentially lead to his loss 
of emotional and social capacity. His rational capabilities were intact to some extent. 
The damage interfered with Gage’s capacity for planning and deciding a course of 
action. Damasio narrates the case of Elliot who had a medical condition that affected 
the frontal lobe. He suffered from poor judgment and lack of insight, though excelled 
in IQ tests. Patients like Gage and Elliot, though they perform well in cognitive and 
intelligence tests, show marked deficits in decision making in everyday life.
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behave rationally. In short, to make rational decisions we need feelings as 
well. Emotion and feeling are equally important for the neural machin-
ery, and are the foundation for biological regulation based on homeo-
static controls. The neural processes and functions that are behind these 
mechanisms are distributed over several locations in the brain; their simul-
taneous working contributes to psychological phenomena. A reduction 
in emotion could contribute to irrational behavior. Those with dysfunc-
tions in decision-making seem to lack emotion, according to his studies.
Damasio’s concept of emotion and the place he gives for the inter-
connections between feeling and reasoning is a welcome relief from the 
dominant theories that see the self as a computational or problem solv-
ing process. Taking a different route, from the notion that emotion is 
a remanence of the inheritance of the reptilian or the old mammalian 
brain, Damasio brings emotion into the forefront of sophisticated self-
expressions and also proposes a theory of self. For Damasio, conscious-
ness is a process whereby the mind gets the reference called self. Yet, to 
understand self is to understand its neural underpinnings and unravel the 
illusory sense of experience and its owner.
[C]onsciousness is the process whereby a mind is imbued with a refer-
ence we call self, and is said to know of its own existence and of the 
existence of objects around it. Elsewhere I have explained that in cer-
tain neurological conditions there is evidence that the mind process 
continues, but consciousness is impaired.  (DaMasio 2003, 192)
[O]vercoming the obstacle of self, which meant, from my standpoint, 
understanding its neural underpinnings, might help us understand 
the very different biological impact of three distinct although closely 
related phenomena: an emotion, the feeling of that emotion, and know-
ing that we have a feeling of that emotion.  (DaMasio 1999, 10)
[T]he neurobiology of consciousness faces two problems: the problem 
of how the movie-in-the-brain is generated, and the problem of how 
the brain also generates the sense that there is an owner and observer 
for that movie. The two problems are so intimately related that the 
latter is nested within the former.  (DaMasio 1999, 12)
Given that he proposes the illusory nature of self one would not expect 
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Damasio to go into the details of the different levels of the “illusory” self. 
However, Damasio distinguishes three kinds of self. There is an inter-
connected and temporarily coherent collection of neural patterns. These 
patterns represent the state of the organism, moment by moment, at 
multiple levels of the brain. This is the unconscious proto-self. The next 
level is the core self, which is produced whenever an object of any kind 
modifies the proto-self. The core self does not change much through-
out our lifetime, and we are conscious of it. Damasio relates his concept 
of core consciousness with the views expressed by earlier thinkers like 
Locke, Brentano, Kant, Freud, and William James. The third level is the 
autobiographical self, which is based on memory and anticipations of 
the future. It develops gradually throughout life. A core self is needed 
in order to acquire an autobiographical self. But the core self can exist 
without the autobiographical self. In certain cases of brain dysfunctions 
patients lose their autobiographical self, temporarily or permanently, 
while their core self is intact. 
If core consciousness allows you to know for a transient moment that 
it is you seeing a bird in flight or that it is you having a sensation 
of pain, extended consciousness places these same experiences in a 
broader canvas and over a longer period of time. Extended conscious-
ness still hinges on the same core “you,” but that “you” is now con-
nected to the lived past and anticipated future that are part of your 
autobiographical record.  (DaMasio 1999, 195)
The autobiographical self permits the existence of a richer form of 
consciousness, that Damasio calls “extended consciousness” which is 
responsible for “conscience” the highest level in this order. Though for 
Damasio the self is a biological reconstruction and the mind is the body, 
the layers of the self that he proposes seem to be borne of more imagi-
nation than biological reductionism. It is also clear that on one hand 
Damasio presents a biologically defined self with emotion meant for bio-
logical survival; on the other hand, his concept of self and consciousness 
bears the stamp of an artist or a person who imagines and believes in 
deeper and finer aspects of self. He writes:
[C]onsciousness is the critical biological function that allows us 
to know sorrow or know joy, to know suffering or know pleasure, 
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to sense embarrassment or pride, to grieve for lost love or lost life. 
Whether individually experienced or observed, pathos is a by-product 
of consciousness and so is desire. None of those personal states would 
ever be known to each of us without consciousness. 
(DaMasio 1999, 7)
Consciousness is, in effect, the key to a life examined,... knowing all 
about the hunger, the thirst, the sex, the tears, the laughter, the kicks, 
the punches, the flow of images we call thought, the feelings, the 
words, the stories, the beliefs, the music and the poetry, the happiness 
and the ecstasy. At its simplest and most basic level, consciousness lets 
us recognize an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a concern for 
the self. At its most complex and elaborate level, consciousness helps 
us develop a concern for other selves and improve the art of life.
 (DaMasio 1999, 8)
Boundaries of Self
The discussion on qualia and emotions are not complete with-
out bringing in the role of self. RaMachandran (2003, 113) considers 
qualia and the self to be two sides of the same coin though he reduces 
both to neural processes. What is the self? Can it be defined by its char-
acteristics and functions?
Let us attempt some definitions for the self, though any definition has 
been problematic since historic times. There is a continuity in all our 
experiences which brings forth the past, present, and future at the same 
moment. We are capable of thinking using information from past and 
expectations about the future. Memories are closely connected and con-
tiguous to all our experiences. Such continuity is felt as adhering to a 
single unit of consciousness which we call “myself.” Contrary to the Car-
tesian dictum “I think, therefore I am,” in our daily lives we first are, and 
therefore able to do many things mental and physical. Otherwise all our 
physical and mental acts would not have a place to adhere to and would 
be floating around. 
We are able to give interconnected meanings to our experiences, learn 
from our mistakes, form beliefs, cherish hopes, have insecurities, express 
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emotions, reflect upon faux pas we make in life—all these rich forms of 
experiences with an unwavering unity and coherence. The first and fore-
most features of self are being (to put it more experientially, the “am-
ness”), continuity, adherence, coherence, and unity. All through these 
several features of self, a common thread that runs through this is that at 
any point we are capable of different degrees of awareness and reflection. 
Perhaps in the evolutionary scale what marks the human self as distinct 
is our capacity to be self-aware at multiple and deeper levels. Our hid-
den capabilities for complex levels of awareness and reflection are amply 
dealt with in the eastern traditions: to mention a few—the concept of 
samyama in “Patanjali Yogasutras,” sakshi caitanya in “Vedanta,” sthi-
taprajna in “Bhagavad Gita,” rasa in “Natyasastra,” and so forth.
RaMachandran, in his five list attributes for self (2003, 113–14), talks 
about embodiment, agency, and ability to be self-aware as important fea-
tures of self. We have a sense of belonging or ownership to the body. We 
exercise freewill. We self-reflect. However, centuries have passed since 
the connections between matter and consciousness, the body and the 
self have been debated with unflinching vigor but with no clear solution 
arising to comprehend the nature of this relation. 
Self in the making
The boundaries of self seem to shift and shrink in the case of narratives 
neuropsychiatrists tell us about brain impairments.12 The self ’s capability 
for expansion and non-dual inclusion seems to be vital for Vedantic and 
other spiritual traditions. Both, neuroscience and spiritual traditions, give 
mind boggling accounts of challenges and possibilities for the self, liter-
ally and figuratively. And, what is also acknowledged in both accounts is 
the recognition of mutual challenges between the body and the spirit, 
the brain and the self. Let us look at the some of the curious challenges 
the brain can give to the self and the self can give to the brain, causing 
disturbances to our otherwise natural intuition for proprioception—the 
feeling and knowledge of the position of the body in space.
12. Brain impairments happen due to lesions—damage or removal of brain areas—
as a result of stroke or surgery.
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With a novel-like quality RaMachandran (1998; 2003), Feinberg 
(2001), DaMasio (1999; 2003), Sacks (1985), and Cytowic (2002)nar-
rate strange and unthinkable experiences, and traverse through the mind 
of the patient like a detective to find the route to the cause that generates 
“irrational” behaviour. The dialogue between the patient and the doctor 
itself in these narratives provides a wonderful opportunity for readers to 
get insights about two selves—an impaired one that is being treated, and 
another intact one setting right the impaired one.
Let us look at a few cases of brain impairments where the self struggles 
without giving a clue for theories and arguments to make sense of it. The 
human self in these cases appears to be very fragile.
A phantom limb is an arm or leg that stays in the minds of patients for 
an indefinite time after it has been surgically removed or lost in an acci-
dent. The phantom limb is stimulated by the brain. Patients are aware 
that the phantom limb is physically absent, but experiences the pain that 
originates from it. Ramachandran writes the case of one of his patients:13
Tom was not crazy. His impression that his missing arm was still there 
is a classic example of a phantom limb—an arm or leg that lingers 
indefinitely in the minds of patients long after it has been lost in an 
accident or removed by a surgeon. Some wake up from anesthesia and 
are incredulous when told that their arm had to be sacrificed, because 
they still vividly feel its presence. Only when they look under the sheets 
do they come to the shocking realization that the limb is really gone. 
Moreover, some of these patients experience excruciating pain in the 
phantom arm, hand or fingers, so much so that they contemplate sui-
cide. The pain is not only unrelenting, it’s also untreatable; no one has 
the foggiest idea of how it arises or how to deal with it. 
(RaMachandran 1998, p 21)
13. In his book Phantoms in the Brain, Ramachandran brings up the fascinating 
information on Penfield maps. These maps, drawn by the Canadian neuroscientist 
Penfield in the 1940s and 1950s, show that the whole body is represented on the 
surface of the brain. The brain representation is disproportionate, with some parts of 
the body represented in larger areas of the brain, such as the mouth, palms, and feet, 
and some in small areas, like the trunk of the body. Ramachandran with his work on 
phantom limbs shows that striking reorganizations in body image occur very rapidly 
following the amputation of a limb. Phantoms limbs are generated by such reorgani-
zations of body image in the sensory cortex. 
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Prosopagnosia is a generalized disturbance in face recognition. Patients 
with prosopagnosia cannot identify anyone by looking at his or her face. 
Prosopagnosia in severe cases impairs self-recognition in the mirror and 
also destroys common intuitions such as the immediacy of self-awareness 
(see RaMachandran 1998; Feinberg, 2001).
Asomatognosia is a condition where one’s own paralyzed limbs are 
misidentified for someone else’s. The severe form of this impairment is 
anosognosia where the paralysis or the illness is denied. Feinberg cites 
the work of the neurologist Edward Weinstein (2001, 17) who argues 
that the manner in which asomatognosic patients refer to their arms as 
belonging to someone else could be interpreted as metaphorical expres-
sions of their feelings about themselves. He held that patients with aso-
matognosia who misidentified parts of their body displayed a disturbance 
in metaphorical speech and tended to express their feelings about them-
selves metaphorically. 
The key point made here by Feinberg, of relevance to the central claim 
of my essay, is that the use of metaphorical language demonstrated by 
these patients served to bring order, unity, and predictability to the fre-
quently confusing circumstances of neurological illness. The brain con-
tinuously creates meaning and projects the self in that context though it 
might appear irrational to the onlookers. In support of my central claim 
here that in spite of the brain impairment, the self somehow copes with 
the brain challenge and creates a corresponding meaning and integrated 
sense of what happens, Feinberg says:
One of the interesting aspects of asomatognosia is that, despite the 
fragmentation of the self, these patients strive to maintain an inte-
grated self and make sense of their experience. Indeed, to a large 
extent they succeed. The neglected left side and the misidentified left 
limb leave a hole, a gap, in the self, that must be filled. The patient 
may disavow the arm, but something is put in its place, something of 
personal significance.  (Feinberg 2001, 30)
Hemispatial-neglect is the condition where objects and one’s own 
body parts on one side, on the side opposite a brain lesion—usually the 
left side—are neglected. Patients with hemispatial-neglect do not simply 
ignore stimuli on one side but act in a manner as if nothing of personal 
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significance could occur on that side (Feinberg 2001, 13). If they are 
asked to draw a daisy it is drawn with the left side incomplete. While 
having a meal, they ignore food on the left side of the plate. Neglected 
patients are profoundly indifferent to objects and events in the left side 
of the world, sometimes including the left side of their own bodies 
(RaMachandran 1998, 82, 88). Hemispatial-neglect is severe and long 
lasting after damage to the right hemisphere, according to Feinberg’s 
studies.14 Asomatognosia, hemispatial-neglect, and anosognosia often 
occur together, usually as a result of damage to the right hemisphere.15
Capgras’ and Cotard’s syndrome are cases where patients are unable 
to give an emotional reference to what they see because of disruptions 
in brain circuitry between eye (or all sense organs) and the emotional 
centre.16 In the case of Capgras’ syndrome, the patient comes to regard 
14. See Feinberg (2001, 12): “The right hemisphere has the capacity to direct 
attention to both sides of space. When there is damage to the left hemisphere, the 
right hemisphere can compensate for the loss, and the patient is still aware of both 
sides of the world and the self. On the other hand, the left hemisphere is much more 
unilateral in its attentional capabilities, and is best at directing the patient’s attention 
to the opposite (right) side. In the presence of damage to the right hemisphere, the 
left hemisphere has limited capacity to adapt, and the left side of space and the body 
may be ignored.”
15. Feinberg (2001, 22) narrates the case of Jack: “Jack had asomatognosia and 
misidentified his left arm. He also had dense anosognosia and insisted that he was in 
pretty good health. He made this claim, even though he was lying in a hospital bed 
in a gown, with an intravenous line in his right arm. Jack knew, all too well, that the 
doctors thought he was ill, that he had suffered a stroke; he even knew the hospital 
staff thought he could not move his left side. Despite this knowledge, he held to his 
belief that he was not ill in any way. Jack insisted that all was well...”
16. See RaMachandran (1998, 116): “A better approach for studying Capgras’ 
syndrome involves taking a closer look at neuroanatomy, specifically at pathways con-
cerned with visual recognition and emotions in the brain.... The temporal lobes con-
tain regions that specialize in face and object recognition.... We know this because 
when specific portions of that pathway are damaged, patients lose the ability to recog-
nize faces, even those of close friends and relatives—as immortalized by Oliver Sacks 
in his book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. In a normal brain, these face 
recognition areas (found on both sides of the brain) relay information to the limbic 
system, found deep in the middle of the brain, which then helps generate emotional 
responses to particular faces.... I may feel love when I see my mother’s face, anger 
when I see the face of a boss or a sexual rival or deliberate indifference upon seeing 
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close acquaintances—usually one’s parents, children, spouse, or sib-
lings—as impostors (RaMchandran, 1998, 115). In Cotard’s syndrome 
the patient will assert that he is dead. RaMachandran argues (1998, 
119) that Cotard’s syndrome is an exaggerated form of Capgras’ syn-
drome and probably has similar origins. In Capgras’ syndrome the face 
recognition area alone is disconnected from the amygdala. In Cotard’s 
syndrome all the sensory areas are disconnected from the limbic system, 
leading to a complete lack of emotional contact with the world.
In these cases too, what strikes us is the self ’s capacity to make meaning 
of what is experienced, even when the brain circuitry is severely severed. 
The person is seen; but no emotion is invoked towards the person seen. 
But since the brain “sees” the person, the self has to find some mean-
ing and associate relevance to what is seen. Hence the patient connects 
emotionally (without the corresponding circuitry to the visual area) and 
identifies the person seen as an impostor. As Ramachandran succinctly 
says17 with the disruption in the neural circuitry between the visual and 
the emotional areas, the patient need only see a face that is not familiar. 
Why should he impute the meaning of an impostor? The possible answer 
the visage of a friend who has betrayed me and has not yet earned my forgiveness. In 
each instance, when I look at the face, my temporal cortex recognizes the image—
mother, boss, friend—and passes on the information to my amygdala (a gateway to 
the limbic system) to discern the emotional significance of that face. When this activa-
tion is then relayed to the rest of my limbic system, I start experiencing the nuances of 
emotion—love, anger, disappointment—appropriate to that particular face...” 
17. See RaMachandran (1998, 116): “After thinking about Arthur’s symptoms, it 
occurred to me that his strange behavior might have resulted from a disconnection 
between these two areas (one concerned with recognition and the other with emo-
tions). Maybe Arthur’s face recognition pathway was still completely normal, and that 
was why he could identify everyone, including his mother and father, but the con-
nections between this “face region” and his amygdala had been selectively damaged. 
If that were the case, Arthur would recognize his parents but would not experience 
any emotions when looking at their faces. He would not feel a “warm glow” when 
looking at his beloved mother, so when he sees her he says to himself, “If this is my 
mother, why doesn’t her presence make me feel like I’m with my mother?” Perhaps 
his only escape from this dilemma—the only sensible interpretation he could make 
given the peculiar disconnection between the two regions of his brain—is to assume 
that this woman merely resembles Mom. She must be an impostor.”
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is that the self perhaps constantly tries to solve dilemmas even when they 
are neurally created.
Are meaning-giving and the unification of experiences functions of the 
brain or the self ? We may argue either way. I would like to think that 
it is the core consciousness (not in the sense of Damasio’s “core con-
sciousnesses”), the deeper and complex realms of our being, which are 
not pervious to our methods of knowledge, that help generate meaning. 
Because finally, according to Vedantic traditions, meaning is a value—
with implications for a lasting existence, and that is identified with the 
ontology of pure consciousness.
The reason that often the discussions on self take a reductive pattern is 
because of the general assumption that consciousness is primarily “sensory 
awareness”—awareness of a sensation. Therefore, the focus of discussion 
is on implicit perceptions and similar phenomena. But, to equate con-
sciousness to one functional aspect of it is to equate the sea with a drop 
of salty sea water, and foreclose the potential and the possibility of self.
Self-Correlates of Consciousness
The major puzzle that brain scientists face is the curious play 
that the brain engages with the self and its tremendous capacity for 
regeneration and re-mapping. There is something that “tells” the brain 
to change according to conditions. The brain seems to be a continuously 
adapting agent based on the cues it receives from what I would call “self-
correlates” of consciousness such as love, hope, affective engagement, 
compassion, happiness, creativity and other such positive qualities. How-
ever much we reduce the human self and identity to neural processes, 
there seems to remain an irreducible, inseparable, core self that is marked 
by human sensitivities and frailties. These are not just neural functions 
but signposts that the self creates. The self through some mechanism, 
unknown to us, has the capacity to overpower the neural limits and act 
on its own, because at times we are able to defy physical conditions and 
express without a physical medium. In an article entitled The Power of 
Hope, Dr. Scott Haig writes about his patient with a brain tumor who 
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makes a spectacular come back from a coma, though only for a few 
moments, to say “goodbye” to his family. Haig writes:
David’s head was literally stuffed with lung cancer. I was called in to 
take care of his hip and pelvic bones broken by the growing metas-
tases. His seeming nonchalance about the pain and the surgery was 
clearly out of concern for his beautiful, young family—his wife Carol, 
a nurse, and his three kids, who were there every night. He couldn’t 
keep up the carefree charade over the next two weeks, though, as his 
speech slurred, then became incoherent. He stopped speaking, then 
moving.... When his doctors rescanned his head, there was barely any 
brain left. The cerebral machine that talked and wondered, winked 
and sang, the machine that remembered jokes and birthdays and 
where the big fish hid on hot days, was nearly gone, replaced by lumps 
of haphazardly growing gray stuff. Gone with that machine seemed 
David as well. No expression, no response to anything we did to him. 
As far as I could tell, he was just not there.... Saturday morning the 
sun poured in as I checked the room. The bed was at chest height, 
made up and empty, with clean, fresh sheets over the vinyl mattress. 
As I turned to leave, I was blocked by a nurse, an older Irish lady with 
a doleful look on her face. She had taken care of David last night. “He 
woke up, you know, doctor— ust after you left—and said goodbye to 
them all. Like I’m talking to you right here. Like a miracle. He talked 
to them and patted them and smiled for about five minutes. Then he 
went out again, and he passed in the hour.”...
 But it wasn’t David’s brain that woke him up to say goodbye that 
Friday. His brain had already been destroyed. Tumor metastases don’t 
simply occupy space and press on things, leaving a whole brain. The 
metastases actually replace tissue. Where that gray stuff grows, the 
brain is just not there. What woke my patient that Friday was sim-
ply his mind, forcing its way through a broken brain, a father’s final 
act to comfort his family. The mind is a uniquely personal domain of 
thought, dreams, and countless other things, like the will, faith, and 
hope. These fine things are as real as rocks and water but, like the 
mind, weightless and invisible, maybe even timeless. Material science 
shies from these things, calling them epiphenomena, programs run-
ning on a computer, tunes on a piano. This understanding can’t be 
ignored; not too much seems to get done on earth without a physical 
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brain. But I know this understanding is not complete, either. I see the 
mind have its way all the time when physical realities challenge it. In a 
patient stubbornly working to rehab after surgery, in a child practicing 
an instrument or struggling to create, a mind or will, clearly separate, 
hovers under the machinery, forcing it toward a goal. It’s wonderful 
to see, such tangible evidence of that fine thing’s power over the mere 
clumps of particles that, however pretty, will eventually clump differ-
ently and vanish.  (Haig 2007)
In the works of several neuropsychiatrists of recent times we see how 
they use the first-person account experiences of their patients to under-
stand the construal of agency and experience in challenging situations. 
These accounts have provided a humanizing picture of the brain and give 
an alternate perspective to understand the brain and the body. Jonathan 
Cole in a telling manner narrates the case of patients with spinal cord 
injury. He explains the neurology and phenomenology of the unusual 
condition of deafferentation in patients. They have extreme difficulty 
with movement because of the lack of senses of touch and propriocep-
tion below the neck. Cole’s narratives (1999) explain how they experi-
ence and project their agency.18
In Still Lives, Jonathan Cole (2004) gives an account of the responses 
he received from people with quadriplegia due to spinal cord injuries for 
the question “what it is like to live without sensation and movement in 
the body?” If the body is dysfunctional, where does the self reside? Cole 
finds that there is no single or simple answer. Studying their experiences, 
Cole explains in the various chapters of the book perhaps what I could 
describe as six self-correlates of consciousness: “enduring,” “exploring,” 
“experimenting,” “observing,” “empowering,” and “continuing.” 
These accounts tell us how a hope for betterment and the extra posi-
tive effort, in spite of the neural challenge, makes the self stable and help 
overpower its own slippery and shifting features.19 The self is studied 
18. Books by Jonathan Cole such as About Face (1999) and Still Lives (2004) look 
at the social and personal difficulties faced by patients with unusual experiences and 
how they manage to reconcile and make progress with the help of “sheer effort, will 
power and an ingenious collection of motor tricks.” See “Nailing the Lie: An interview 
with Jonathan Cole,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11/2 (February 2004): 3–22. 
19. Bhagavad Gita 6:5 says “uplift yourself by your own efforts.”
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through an engaged self-exploratory method with the intervention of 
values and positive dispositions. What is significant about such neurop-
sychiatric literature is the shift in focus from third-person neural data 
to first person qualities of willpower and self-effort. The first-person 
qualities are being recognised as pertinent to cope up with challeng-
ing physical conditions and to help achieve some (neural and experi-
ential) progress. The detached and reductionist theories of self will not 
give space for exploring its own possibilities. In DaMasio’s (2003, 287) 
hopeful words: “Nature lacks a plan for human flourishing, but nature’s 
humans are allowed to devise such a plan.”
Self in the brain and brain in the self
Yet another section of medical literature that highlights the scope of the 
self and the mutual challenges between the brain and the self are the 
recent studies on the connections (structural and ontological) between 
the brain and god. These works do not move away from the fundamental 
(scientific) position that however profound the “god experience,” it must 
be channeled and experienced through the brain.20 The major hypotheses 
that underlie these works21 are the role of “association areas,”22 the brain 
and the brain’s capacity to distinguish between a self and the rest (not-self) 
outside it, and also alter or extend this division. Newberg et al.’s stud-
ies (2001) on the neural correlates of meditative experiences of Tibetan 
monks have shown change in all the association areas, and in particular, 
less activity in the orientation association area or the prefrontal cortex. 
The studies conducted by Newberg and d’Aquili carve a different space 
amongst the increasing number of brain theorists on mystical and reli-
20. Newberg (2001, 53): “... if God does indeed exist, the only place he can mani-
fest his existence would be in the tangled neural pathways and physiological struc-
tures of the brain.”
21. See studies by Andrew Newberg et al. 2001; and Saver and Rabin, “The Neural 
Substrates of Religious Experience,” Journal of Neuropsychiatry 9/3 (1997): 498–510.
22. Association areas are cortical areas where complex processing of information 
happens. These areas gather information from various parts of the brain. Information 
from one sensory system is integrated with information from other sensory systems. 
Association areas connect to emotional and memory centers and thereby give mean-
ing and context for the sensory experience. 
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gious experience. Their works (d’Aquili & Newberg 1993; Newberg, 
d’Aquili, & Rause 2001) are notable for certain ideas that do not claim 
a strict naturalistic interpretation. To enlist some: Newberg and d’Aquili 
suggest a continuum that ranges between the experience of baseline real-
ity and “profound unitary consciousness” (“absolute unitary being”).23 
The absolute unitary being experience is marked by clear neural signs 
such as increased blood flow to the prefrontal cortex, which is the area of 
concentration, and decreased activity in the orientation association area 
in the parietal lobe. The decreased activity in the orientation association 
area is responsible for the sensation of losing one’s self or expanding its 
boundaries.
While Descartes considers the body and the mind to be completely 
separate, DaMasio (1994) and LeDoux (2002) consider the mind as a 
derivative of brain function, and Newberg and d’Aquili hold the view 
that while the mind is derived from the brain, “interaction is much more 
complex and intriguing” (2001, 191).
The question that comes back to us is “where is the self?” Is it a figment 
of the mind produced in cooperation with brain activity? How does the 
trio of brain, mind, and self work together? Can their working be explained 
successfully by neurology? How easy, or in other words, even desir-
able, is it to naturalise the self, and reduce it to a few physical functions?
Conclusion
The structural anatomy of the brain and the course of its func-
tioning present exciting issues on the scope of the self and its interaction 
23. See Newberg (2001, 119–20): “In this state of total differentiation of the ori-
entation area, the mind would perceive a neurological reality consistent with many 
mystical descriptions of the ultimate spiritual union: There would be no discrete 
objects or beings, no sense of space or the passage of time, no line between the self 
and the rest of the universe. In fact there would be no subjective self at all; there 
would only be an absolute sense of unity—without thoughts, without words and 
without sensation. The mind would exist without ego in a state of pure undifferenti-
ated awareness.… This state of pure mind, of an awareness beyond object and sub-
ject, is Absolute Unitary Being, the ultimate unitary state.”
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with the brain, for debate and reflection. These issues bring to us the 
central impasse in consciousness studies such as the subjective and self-
preserving nature of the brain. It is almost baffling to think that the brain 
is capable of not just change and growth but also able to alter its course 
as a self-preserving system, and “reflect” upon that course with the help 
of cues from a self which is located nowhere, or perhaps everywhere. 
It facilitates the mind to think, imagine, and direct action according to 
newer and challenging contexts. 
The “hard problem” of consciousness has crossed the “decade of the 
brain” and is closing in for another decade. Yet the problem has only vet-
ted newer and newer responses without being able to offer a resolution. 
Why and how does the quantitative structural input of the brain give rise 
to consciousness that is possessed and housed by a self whose contours 
are bordered by deeply subjective qualities? 
Damasio’s efforts to prove Descartes’ dualism wrong and Tedd Fein-
berg’s proposal for “compositional or nested hierarchy” (Feinberg 
2001, 127) suggests that the self and the subjective nature of experience 
is not an issue to be dispensed with simple naturalistic theories. Perhaps 
we need to study better the finer aspects of higher human faculties such 
as introspection, reflection, and contemplation. In mainstream neuro-
science the discussion is generally on a fractured self, a self impaired by 
neurological dysfunctions, or a segregated self. The self discussed from 
that perspective is already limited to a certain disposition. The self-
ascriptions are about the self that is already impaired, or valid only in that 
context. Such an approach takes away the wholesome personality out of 
context, and focuses on the dissociative or hallucinating self. There is no 
adequate discussion on the experience after the impairment is intervened 
or cured. Perhaps anticipating this significant issue, Metzinger says:
The issue is not only how a phenomenal self per se can arise but how 
beings like ourselves come to use this phenomenal self as a tool for 
experiencing themselves as subjects. We need interdisciplinary answers 
to questions like these: What does it mean that in conscious experi-
ence we are not only related to the world, but related to it as knowing 
selves? What, exactly, does it mean that a phenomenal self typically is 
not only present in an experiential reality but that at the same time it 
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forms the center of this reality? How do we come to think and speak 
about ourselves as first persons?  (Metzinger 2003, 6)
To limit the self-brain interactions to linear and physical processes would 
foreclose the richness and possibilities that lie hidden. The self-chal-
lenged brain and the brain-challenged self reinforce, change, and adjust 
each other. And through these “adjustments” they create meaning and 
purpose that we constantly experience in our lives. It seems that the self 
is the possibility for the brain to look “inward,” and the brain is the van-
tage for the self to look “outward”—a mutually balancing process. Per-
haps it is through their complex interrelations that we understand both. 
A well-known Upanishadic verse goes like this: the self has no sensory 
apparatus directed towards itself; since sense organs are directed out-
wards it can see only the outside and not the inner self; the brave turns 
his eye inwards, desiring immortality. 
If the eye is not turned inwards then you see a struggling self with its 
boundaries shifting not only because of neural features but also with the 
challenges received from emotional upsurges, personal insecurities, and 
social living. Like being in an architectural space, the self who tries to 
objectify itself is already situated within the self; and hence will never be 
able to see all of it in one instance. The hidden possibilities of the inner 
self are revealed when the inward looking eye is favoured.
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